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This paper examines the implications of parallel trade for the level of innovations in health care 
market, the price of the innovated drug and for the welfare levels of the Third and the Rich world. 
These implications are drawn in terms of both the size of the Third-world and the Rich-world 
markets relative to the differences in their per capita income levels and the distribution of potential 
buyers in each market over different income levels.  
 
Possibly the most researched example of the impact of parallel trade on market access to drugs is 
that of the AIDS drugs. This is not surprising given that they have become the object of numerous 
international initiatives such as the Global Fund aimed at transferring income to poorer nations so 
as to increase their purchasing power for medicines. Although the Global Fund also covers 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, the idea that parallel imports may affect market is not so relevant in 
those cases. The reason is that, unlike AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria are mostly prevalent only in 
low income countries and therefore, the higher income countries are unlikely to represent a 
significant proportion of the demand for the medicines targeting such illness. Hence, richer 
countries are not likely to drive out supply to lower income countries in the presence of price 
arbitrage1. 
 
The importance of parallel imports on the pricing strategies of AIDS drugs is well documented. For 
instance, Scherer and Watal (2002), and Hornbeck (2005) show that there is little statistical 
evidence of income based price discrimination in AIDS drugs across countries. They both suggest 
increasing the barriers to parallel trade as a way to increase well-being of poorer nations. However, 
as Rovira (2002) points out, it is sometimes too simplistic to just think of rich and poor countries in 
the world as the key to increasing access to medicines. Issues such as the scope and extent of 
coverage provided by national health systems become relevant especially in the presence of intra-
country income inequality. Indeed, Hornbeck (2005) hints that there might be some link between 
intra-country inequality and the pricing of AIDS drugs. This strategic aspect of pricing raises the 
                                                  
1 Note this does not mean that the development and access to say malaria vaccines is not a challenge. It just posses 
different problems, more specifically, a public procurement problem as in those cases the market demand (due to low 
purchasing power) is just not strong enough to provide enough incentives for pharmaceutical firms to develop 
innovative drugs.  
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issue of how not just different countries but, also different income groups within each country are 
affected by the ability of firms to implement international price discrimination.  
 
The markets in different countries that differ with respect to willingness-to-pay for internationally 
traded commodities create scope as well as incentive for the MNCs having monopoly rights over 
their patented range of products to price discriminate. But, parallel trading limits the extent to 
which such price discrimination is feasible (and profitable). Rules of internal market in the EU 
allows parallel trade of any on-patent product, by which any trading firm can purchase such goods 
from the market supplied by the patent holding manufacturer and sell them in any other market 
without requiring the consent of the patent holder. Allowing for parallel trade as the rule of internal 
market in the EU emerged out of the Treaty of Rome and has found endorsement in the European 
Court of Justice that held that a patent holder’s rights are exhausted EU-wide once the on-patent 
product is placed anywhere in the EU market. Parallel imports (and external referencing) especially 
of drugs are now being allowed in many other countries. For example, the new legislation in South 
Africa allows her health minister to resort to parallel imports if an on-patent drug is sold at a very 
high price [Maskus (2001)]. This has become the bone of contention triggering countless debates 
on who gains from such parallel trading. Danzon (1998) has been severely critical of the rationale 
of such a policy arguing strongly that this will in fact increase the price of imported drugs in the 
low-income countries and lower welfare all around.  
 
Parallel imports restrict the patent holder’s ability to discriminate among different markets on the 
basis of persisting income differences. If volumes of parallel imports are sufficiently high, the 
patent holder firm is forced to charge a uniform price in all markets related through trade. The only 
difference in prices across markets that might still exist would simply reflect differences in 
transport costs and different country-specific rates of tariffs. By the conventional wisdom of 
standard economic theory, the uniform price will be set somewhere between the highest and lowest 
discriminatory prices. Of course, as pointed out by Maskus (2001) and Jelovac and Bordoy (2005), 
there can be complete price convergence (or global uniform pricing) only if consumers value the 
original and parallel imported drugs equally. But this may not be the case because of different 
packages or guarantees. In general, however, under parallel imports, some of the low-income 
countries will experience an increase in the prices of drugs after parallel trading, and even worse, 
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they may simply be priced out of the market, thus losing access to new drugs [Danzon (1998), 
Maskus (2001), Malueg and Schwartz (1994)]. This is now a major concern and the origin of an 
ongoing debate on how to ensure Third World access to new innovated drugs, as low 
discriminatory prices can no longer be charged in these markets, and a low uniform price, as the 
pharmaceutical MNCs argue, cannot cover the costs of R&D2.  
 
The price convergence under parallel trading may also entail welfare losses for the poorer countries 
even when all these countries are served, whereas it may bring in gains for the richer countries.  
Jelovac and Bordoy (2005) have found an improvement in the total welfare when the countries 
differ only in their drug needs but a decline when they have different health insurance 
reimbursement policies. In addition to these static losses, there are some dynamic (or long term) 
losses as well. The lower profits for the multinational pharmaceutical companies may in fact lower 
their incentives to develop new drugs that involve substantial R&D costs. Of late, Valletti (2006) 
has precisely argued along this line in a model of vertical product differentiation with the marginal 
willingness-to-pay for the innovated quality of a drug varying both within and across the countries. 
In particular, he finds that a patent holder firm will invest less in product-R&D and develop a lower 
quality variety of a drug under parallel imports than it would have done in the absence of such a 
rule of internal market. But, for some extreme parametric values, he finds an improvement in the 
global welfare under parallel importing.  
 
However, the improvement in global welfare is less appealing if it is associated with a fall in 
consumers’ surplus in the low-income countries. So it is worthwhile to know the country-specific 
welfare properties of parallel trading that depend on the direction of the consequent changes in both 
the price and the level of R&D investment. This country-specific welfare effect is an important 
determinant of parallel trade as a policy choice of the trading nations behaving non-cooperatively. 
For example, Richardson (2002) has demonstrated that when countries can individually choose 
whether or not to allow parallel imports, the unique Nash equilibrium is the one where all countries 
that are served permit parallel importing. This is because the high-price countries that benefit from 
                                                  
2 The Global Fund launched by the UN has been driven primarily by this cause of concern. See Acharyya and Garcia-
Alonso (2006) for a discussion on how such a cash transfer programme, even under parallel imports, can induce 
innovation of drugs. Moreover, such innovations provide a self-interested motive for buyers in the rich countries to 
participate voluntarily in such Global Fund programme.  
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parallel imports can undo price discrimination. This results in global uniform pricing3. Of course, 
this result depends on the inability of the low-price countries to restrict parallel exports of the drug 
to the high-price countries. But when the countries can simultaneously choose parallel imports and 
exports policies, (market-based) price discrimination will be the Nash equilibrium outcome. 
However, his analysis is based on only the static price and output effects of parallel imports on 
country-specific welfare. It is to be seen, therefore, what implications does the under-investment 
result have on the country-specific welfare levels and consequently on the individual decisions of 
the trading nations regarding whether to allow or prohibit parallel trade.  
 
Given such specific concerns, our analysis differs from that of Valletti (2006) in one important 
direction. We take into account the intra-country non-uniform income distributions and physical 
size differences of the countries in addition to their difference in the maximum willingness-to-pay 
for the innovated drug. Though the under-investment result still holds, under full market coverage 
the uniform price under parallel imports is smaller than the discriminatory prices. As we 
demonstrate here, whether all the markets and all the consumers in each market will be covered 
under parallel imports or not depends on the inter and intra country income distribution pattern in 
relation to the (relative) degree of the per-capita income differences of the countries. When it is 
profitable for the patent-holder firm to serve all the markets and consumers, parallel imports 
unambiguously lowers the (uniform) price of the innovated drug below the lowest discriminatory 
price. This is because under full market coverage, under-investment and thus development of a 
lower quality drug must be accompanied by a reduction in its price to induce all consumers to buy 
the innovated drug. This result is important and, in fact, rationalizes the apprehension underlying 
the South African legislation modification that discriminatory prices may result in higher domestic 
prices of imported drugs. By implicitly assuming all markets that are served are partially covered 
by the MNC, Valletti (2006) ignores this possibility of the uniform price under parallel imports 
being lower in all countries including the country with the lowest price under discrimination. But as 
demonstrated by Wauthy (1996) and Acharyya (1998), the extent of market coverage should be an 
equilibrium outcome of the profit-maximizing behaviour of firm(s) rather than an ex ante 
restriction.  
                                                  
3 But if governments have political economy concerns, then even high-price countries may choose to prohibit parallel 
imports [Richardson (2002, p. 242)]. 
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Yet, consumers in the low-income countries lose under parallel trading because the price decline 
does not compensate them for the under-investment in R&D that results in development of a lower 
quality drug compared to the discriminatory regime. Thus, observation by Maskus (2001) that “it is 
curious that most developing countries express opposition to restricting parallel trade” is correct 
but for different reasons4. These oppositions to restrict parallel trade are hard to justify not because 
parallel imports would actually result in higher prices of drugs, but because it would lead to under-
investment in innovations resulting in a poor quality of life and loss of welfare.  
 
We also find that only the very rich buyers in the rich world may gain because for them the uniform 
pricing under parallel imports brings in a large decline in the price of the new drug that may 
overcompensate its utility loss from the low level of innovation. But if the patent-holder MNC 
belongs to the rich world and its lower profit is taken into account, total welfare of the rich country 
unambiguously falls. Thus, parallel trading does not bring any welfare gain at all. Both the country-
specific and the global welfare levels decline unambiguously. This means that when the R&D 
effect is also taken into account, even the high-price countries may prefer discrimination. Indeed, 
once we allow for intra-country income inequality, even discarding the MNC’s profit, there will be 
cases in which the richer country prefers price discrimination as well. That is, in those cases no 
countries will have any incentive under the welfare criterion to undo price discrimination. Thus, the 
first result of Richardson (2002) is invalidated whereas his second result (viz. price discrimination 
as the equilibrium choice of countries) extends to the R&D case even when the low-price countries 
cannot restrict parallel exports.   
 
Our results can also be related to Malueg and Schwartz (1994), though, unlike Malueg and 
Schwartz (1994), we are concerned with the impact of parallel imports on the different consumer 
groups and not aggregate welfare. However, for the case of no intra-country income inequality, it is 
straightforward to compare the welfare levels with and without parallel imports. What we find out 
is that price discrimination is then good for welfare even if no markets are dropped as a result of 
parallel imports. This result is partially due to the lower optimal quality with parallel imports and 
contrasts with Malueg and Schwartz (1994). Still, the main driver of the result in their paper is that 
uniform pricing improves allocative efficiency. That effect is not present in our paper since the 
                                                  
4 See Abbott (1998). 
 6 
demands are unitary and the firm will always set a price that will make all rich consumers buy, and 
therefore, any changes in price will just imply a transfer of surplus between consumer and producer 
without deadweight loss.  
 
Our paper suggests an alternative interpretation of our assumption of intra-country inequality. We 
consider a world with blocks of countries with different incomes (a developed block and a 
developing block) that may or may not allow parallel imports across or within the block itself. This 
case is relevant to the current discussions on patent protection and price arbitrage within the 
context of WTO trade negotiations and the existence of free trade zones such us the EU. 
 
The preference structure used to demonstrate the above-mentioned results is drawn heavily from 
the self-selection model developed in Cooper (1984) and Acharyya (1998, 2005)5. Two different 
cases are discussed. In the first case, there is no intra-country but only inter-country income 
differences. This case is studied to capture the implications of the relative size of countries 
differing in terms of their per capita income. In the second case, we allow for intra-country income 
disparity to demonstrate that under certain parametric restrictions on the distribution pattern in the 
rich world, the very rich consumers may benefit from parallel trading. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we consider the benchmark case of per 
capita income differences of the countries with no intra-country income disparity. Section 3 
examines the welfare properties of parallel imports when intra-country income disparity exists. A 
re-interpretation of the model to study regional exhaustion, instead of global exhaustion, of 
property rights is provided in section 4. Finally, we conclude the paper in section 5. 
 
2. Health Care Innovation in a Two-Country World Economy 
Consider a world economy with two countries: a poor country or a Third World (T) and a rich 
country (R). To begin with, consider inter-country income differences but no intra-country income 
disparity. Let the per capita income levels be yT and yR, and the number of consumers be nT and nR 
in the Third and the rich world respectively. Consumers in each country have identical valuations  
                                                  
5 These analyses examine the choice of a monopolist over a separating and a pooling (or uniform) price-quality menu 
for heterogeneous consumers in a market without any threat from imports.  For a related earlier work, see Mussa and 
Rosen (1978).    
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for a particular quality of the drug that is being developed by a pharmaceutical MNC. This 
valuation is assumed to be linearly related to the income level. Each consumer buys, if at all, only 
one unit of the drug. Thus a representative consumer in country-j, j = T, R, derives (gross) utility 
from buying a drug of quality s as: 
 
                 Uj = u(yj, s)                                                                                                      (1) 
 
that increases at a decreasing rate with the higher quality of the drug: 
 
                 us > 0, uss  0                                                                                                    (2) 
 
By our assumption, since  yT  <  yR, so, 
 
                 u(yT, s) < u(yR, s)   s                                                                                      (3) 
 
Thus, a rich-world buyer derives greater utility than a Third-world buyer from the same quality 
drug. Moreover, following the literature on quality choice, it is reasonable to assume that a rich-
world buyer has a greater addition to his utility and hence would be willing to pay more at the 
margin for a better quality drug that is innovated than a Third-world buyer would like to: 
 










   s                                                                            (4) 
 
These restrictions on the preference function have been widely used in the parallel literature on 
quality choice with heterogeneous consumers [Mussa and Rosen (1978), Shaked and Sutton (1982), 
Cooper (1984), Acharyya (1998, 2005)]. 
 
To exemplify our results we assume a linear form of the utility function defined in (1): 
 
                   u(yj, s) = yjs                                                                                                  (1a)                                                                                                      
 8 
This linear preference structure, however, does not alter our results qualitatively. Note that (1a) 
satisfies all the desirable properties as specified in (2) – (4). Let the reservation utility of a buyer of 
income yj be zero.  Thus, by the individually rational (IR) constraint, he buys the drug if, 
 
               yjs    P                                                                                                             (5) 
 
There is a single pharmaceutical MNC situated in the rich country that plans to develop a new drug 
of quality s by investing the amount C in R&D. This R&D investment is increasing at an increasing 
rate in the target level of quality of the innovated drug: 
 
                   C = 2
2
1
s                                                                                                         (6) 
 
Except for this sunk cost, there is no other cost. Once the drug is developed, the MNC gets a patent 
that confers it with a monopoly right over its exclusive sales in different markets. Given the income 
differences across the rich and the Third world, such monopoly right creates scope for market-
based (price) discrimination (MBD) for the MNC. However, its ability to discriminate may be 
limited by parallel trading allowed by the countries. The MNC’s innovation level and pricing of the 
drug thus vary according to whether parallel imports are allowed or not. In the following 
subsections, we consider investment decisions and welfare properties under each of these two 
regimes. The choices under the MBD regime are denoted by subscript D, whereas those under 
parallel imports are denoted by subscript PI. 
 
2.1  Health Care Innovation under MBD 
Given the IR constraint in (5), for any innovated quality of the drug, under the MBD regime the 
MNC extracts all surpluses from the consumers in each country by charging PjD  =  yjs, j = R, T. 
Thus, the profit realized equals, 
 
               D = (nTyT + nRyR)sD                                                                                   (7) 
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The MNC decides about the quality level of the innovated drug and corresponding R&D 
investment level by maximizing this ex post (or realized) profit net of the R&D cost: 




Ds                                                                   (8) 
The first-order condition yields the following choice of quality level and corresponding investment 
level: 
              eDs  =  nTyT + nRyR                                                                                         (9) 
 
The corresponding equilibrium prices are: 
 
               eDjP   = (nTyT + nRyR)yj  , j = T, R                                                                (10) 
 
Note that both the innovated quality of the drug and its market-specific (discriminatory) prices 
depend on the income levels as well as on the size of the markets. 
 
Since all surpluses are extracted by the MNC from both the rich and the poor consumers, the 
consumers’ surplus in each country is zero, and the welfare of the rich country equals the profit of 
the MNC under MBD. 
 
2.2  Parallel Imports 
When parallel imports and exports are allowed by the two countries, the traders buy the drug in the 
low-priced Third World and export it to the high-priced Rich world. Thus, assume that the Third 
World government allows parallel exports and the rich world government allows parallel imports 
of the innovated drug. These policies limit the patent-holder MNC’s ability to discriminate between 
the two countries. The MNC can still charge differential pricing if it offers limited geographical 
warranty for the innovated drug. Since the parallel traders cannot provide warranty coverage for the 
parallel exported drugs to the rich world, the buyers in the rich world would value these drugs less 
than the one sold by the MNC to them. Thus, as argued by Jelovac and Bordoy (2005) and Maskus 
(2001), even under parallel trading the prices need not be the same in the two markets. To illustrate, 
let  < 1 be the rate at which buyers in the rich world discount the value of the drug re-exported 
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under parallel trading.  Thus, the net utility that a representative rich-world buyer receives from 
buying the low-priced drug imported from the Third World equals, 
 
          V(yR, S) =  yRs -  yTs 
 
where, S is the perceived quality of the parallel imported drug.  
 
If the MNC charges the price pR to him, he buys it if V(yR, s)  V(yR, S), i.e., if, 
 
              pR   yTs + (1 - ) yRs 
 
Thus, for   < 1, the MNC can charge a higher price than the price yTs at which the innovated drug 
is sold by it in the Third World and re-exported to the rich world by the parallel traders. But if there 
is no geographical warranty and other reasons for the rich-world buyers to differentiate between the 
drug sold by the MNC and the one re-exported by parallel traders (i.e.,  = 1), parallel trading will 
erode all price differences across these two markets. In rest of the analysis, however, we shall 
assume that the buyers do not discount the re-exported drug so that under PI the monopolist must 
charge uniform price in all the markets. For drugs that are search goods in nature in the 
terminology of Nelson (1974) – whose quality is known to the buyers a priori – like the one 
modeled here (and in the existing literature), warranty does not make much of a sense and thus 
discounted valuation of the parallel imported drugs needs to be justified differently6.  
 
Given the (per capita) income differences of the countries, there are two possible (uniform) prices 
for any innovated quality. One is charging yRs and thus excluding the Third world buyers from 
accessing the innovated drug. This is the case of partial coverage of the global (or integrated) 
market. Equilibrium choices under this partial coverage are denoted by tilde over the choice 
variables. The other is charging the lower uniform price yTs, which is the case of full (global) 
market coverage.  
 
                                                  
6 The geographical warranty story is more relevant for durable pharmaceutical products like surgical instruments, 
sphygmomanometer, medical testing kits and the like, but not so much perhaps for drugs.   
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Proceeding as before, it is straightforward to check the following two quality levels under partial 
and full market coverage: 
 
               RR
e
PI yns 
~                                                                                                    (11a) 
                 TRTePI ynns                                                                                             (11b) 
 
Thus the choice of the market coverage under PI depends on the size of the two countries. More 
precisely, 










                 Proof: Given (11a) and (11b), the profits from serving only the rich world and from  
                            serving both the markets are respectively, 
                                     2)(
2
1~
RRPI yn   
                                     2])[(
2
1
TRTPI ynn    
                             Thus, PIPI 
~  if  (nT + nR)yT > nRyR, which boils down to, 









                                                                                  (12) 
                              Hence the claim.   
 
This is understandable. Only if the number of potential buyers in the Third world is sufficiently 
large in the sense defined in (12), it makes sense for the MNC to charge a lower uniform price yTs 
to serve both the markets. Moreover, the larger is the income gap across the rich and the Third 
world, the greater should be the size of the market in the Third world to induce the MNC to cater to 
them. However, note that the loss of access to new drugs for the Third world under PI (when it is 
not sufficiently large in size in the sense defined in (12)) is because of the profit-maximizing motive 
of the MNC rather than the oft-quoted argument that the low uniform price that enables such access 
does not cover the cost of innovation. The policy implication of this result is that a small country 
(in the above sense) should not allow parallel exports of the drug to the rich world if it has to 
ensure access to the innovated drug for its own consumers.  
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The interesting observation is that if serving all markets is profitable for the MNC, it develops a 
higher quality drug than when it caters only to the rich-world buyers. But in both these cases, 
regardless of the relative country sizes, PI leads to lower R&D investment and innovation of lower 
quality drug than under MBD. Therefore, 
 
    Proposition 1: Parallel imports unambiguously lower health care innovation. The extent of  
                             such decline in the investment is larger for a relative size of the Third world  
                             smaller than that specified in (12).  
     Proof:  The first part follows directly from the quality choices under MBD and PI as in (9),  
                  (11a) and (11b). For the second part, it is sufficient to note that 2
1
)~(2~ PIPIs   and  
                  2
1
)(2 PIPIs  , so that for a relative size of the Third world smaller than that specified  
                   in (12), ePI
e
PI ss
~ .    
 
 
2.3  The Welfare Property of PI 
The relevant case for comparison of equilibrium prices and welfare levels under market-based 
discrimination and parallel import regimes is the one where both countries are served7. This 
confines us to the relative country sizes defined in (12). It is then straightforward to check that, 
 




PI yyynPP )(                                                                     (13) 
 
Therefore, 
Lemma 2:  Under parallel imports the poor country buyers get the innovated drug, albeit 
of lower quality, at a lower price than under market-based discrimination.  
Proof:        Since yR > yT , the result follows directly from (13).   
 
                                                  
7 When only the rich world is served under PI, it unambiguously loses. As in case of MBD, the MNC extracts all the 
surpluses from the buyers there so that the social welfare of the rich world is just the MNC profit, which, however, is 
smaller under PI than under MBD. 
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This is contrary to what Maskus (2001) argued, but of course is not counter-intuitive. When it is 
profitable for the MNC to serve the poor country, it must lower the price below the discriminatory 
price eDTP  to satisfy the IR constraint (5) of the buyers there since the innovated drug is now of a 
lower quality variety. That is, the uniform price under PI is lower than both the discriminatory 
prices because of the adverse dynamic (or R&D) effect of PI that has been ignored Maskus and 
other researchers while discussing the effect on the drug prices.  This result, in fact, can be stated in 
more general terms. As long as the marginal-willingness-to-pay for higher innovated quality differs 
across different countries, be it due to (per capita) income or taste or both, PI will lower the price of 
the drug all around, provided of course it is still profitable for the MNC to serve all markets as 
under MBD8.   
 
Yet, the Third world does not gain. In fact it does not lose either because under both the market-
based discrimination and parallel import regimes the MNC extracts all surpluses from the 
consumers there. The rich-country buyers, on the other hand, unambiguously gain because the 
uniform pricing under parallel imports leaves them with a strictly positive net surplus. The loss of 
utility from the lower quality of health care is overcompensated by the large decline in the price 
that is required to induce the buyers in the poor-country to buy the innovated drug.  
 
Regarding the rich country, it is worth noting that even though consumer surplus is higher with 
parallel imports (due to the lower price that compensates for the lower quality), once the MNC 
profits are added to welfare, the higher profits the MNC gets under MBD actually compensate for 
the lower consumer surplus thereby making MBD preferable for a rich country with a MNC9.  
 
2.4  International Redistribution of Income  
An interesting policy implication that follows from the above discussions is that an international 
redistribution of income from the rich to the poor world, such as the UN launched Global Fund, 
                                                  
8 As pointed out by Tirole (1989), as long as the preference structure satisfies the properties specified above, the source 
of consumer heterogeneity (across or within countries) does not matter. For a more elaborate discussion on this see 
Acharyya (2005).  
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may induce higher innovation as well as access of the Third world to such innovation. Let Tyˆ  and 
Ryˆ  be the post-transfer income levels of consumers in the Third and the rich world respectively. 
Under the market-based discrimination, denoting the post-transfer innovation level as sDF, using (9) 
we can write, 
 
                sD - sDF  = nR(yR - Ryˆ ) - nT ( Tyˆ  - yT)                                                                         (14) 
 
But since in this two-country model, the total contribution by the rich country must equal the 
income received by the poor country, so nR(yR - Ryˆ ) = nT ( Tyˆ  - yT). Hence, sD = sDF . Thus, an 
international redistribution of income from the rich to the Third leaves the innovated quality of the 
drug unchanged. 
 
Under parallel imports, on the other hand, such redistribution of income raises the innovation level 
when both the markets are served. This is evident from (11b). Moreover, since the right-hand-side 
value in (12) declines with such a transfer, transfers now make it profitable for the MNC to cater to 
even a smaller sized Third world. In other words, a transfer of income from the rich to the Third 
world ensures access to the innovated drugs and health care even for a smaller Third world. This 
result is similar to the one derived in Acharyya and Garcia-Alonso (2006).  
 
3.  Intra-Country Income Differences and Health Care Innovation   
 
The intra-country income disparity, which has not been considered in the benchmark case 
discussed above, is often quite significant in the Third and the rich world. In this section, we 
examine how far do our results change in such a case.  
 
There are several ways one can introduce intra-country income disparity in the basic framework of 
analysis. One simple and tractable way is to consider the discrete case where there are only two 
income levels in each country: Ty  and yM in the Third world and, yM and Ry  in the rich world, and 
Ty  < yM < Ry . Essentially this means that the two countries differ both in respect to the minimum 
and the maximum willingness-to-pay. We shall later discuss the implication of countries differing 
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only in respect of the maximum willingness-to-pay as in Valletti (2006). Let nT1, nTM, nRM and nR2 
are the number of (potential) buyers in the respective income classes in the two countries. For the 
purpose of drawing implications of intra-country income disparity and distribution pattern per se, 
we make two assumptions. First of all, the country sizes are the same as before: 
 
                     nT1 + nTM  = nT                                                                                              (15a) 
                     nRM + nR2  = nR                                                                                              (15b) 
 
Second, the national incomes of the countries remain the same. That is,  
 
                        nT1 Ty  + nTM yM  = nT yT                                                                            (16a) 
                        nRM yM + nR2 Ry   = nR yR                                                                           (16b) 
 
Thus, given (15), Ty  < yT  and  yR < Ry .   
 
3.1  Single Price  under Market-Based Discrimination 
Perfect price discrimination is no longer possible now even when parallel imports are not allowed. 
This is because a priori the exact type of a buyer in any market is not known to the MNC. For 
example, for any given choice of the innovated quality s, if in the rich world the MNC charges the 
poorer buyers with income yM the price yMs and the richer buyers with income Ry  the price Ry s, 
the expected profit (nRM yM + nR2 Ry )s is never realized unless the MNC can identify who are the 
poorer and who are the richer buyers, and accordingly can prohibit the richer buyers from 
mimicking the poorer buyers. Thus, without parallel imports, the MNC is forced to charge uniform 
prices in each country, which, however, may differ across these national markets.   
 
Under MBD, serving only one market is clearly profit reducing for the MNC since without parallel 
trading, there would be no arbitrage across the countries. The choice for the MNC is then whether 
to cater to all types in each market by charging a low uniform price, to only the richer buyers in the 
Third world but serving all in the rich world, to all in the Third world but only the richer buyers in 
the rich world, and finally, only the richer people in each country. The first one is what we call full 
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market coverage whereas the other three possibilities are the different cases of partial market 
coverage. These choices of price and the extent of coverage of each market depend on the size of 
income classes or the pattern of intra-country income disparity in each country, similar to the 
condition (12). In particular, 
 
Lemma 3:  With intra-country income disparity, the patent-holder MNC serves all markets 
with full coverage under MBD if the income distribution pattern in each country 
satisfies,    









1                                                             (17a) 











                                                            (17b) 
Proof:       See appendix.   
 
Note that these conditions are consistent with both uniform distribution (nT1 = nTM, nRM = nR2) and 
non-uniform distribution. In rest of our analysis, we confine ourselves to these income distribution 
patterns that ensure the full market coverage in each country. Later we will discuss the implications 
of different cases of partial market coverage. 
 
Following similar arguments as in the case of no intra-country income disparity, it is immediate 
that the MNC will charge the (uniform) prices Ty s and yMs in the Third and the rich world 
respectively when the markets are fully covered. These prices extract all the surpluses from the 
poorer buyers but leave the richer buyers with strictly positive net surpluses, and yield the ex post 
profit equal to [(nT1 + nTM) Ty s + (nRM + nR2) yMs]. Maximization of this profit net of the R&D cost 
gives us the following choice of innovated quality: 
 
              eDsˆ   = [(nT1 + nTM) Ty  + (nRM + nR2) yM]                                                         (18) 
 
where, we put “hat” on the quality choice to distinguish it from the quality choice when there is no 
intra-country income disparity.  
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Comparing (9) and (18), the following result is immediately evident: 
 
Lemma 4: Intra-country income disparity per se lowers the level of health care innovation, 
i.e, eDsˆ  < 
e
Ds . 
Proof: By the assumption made in (15) we can write,   
 eDs  - 
e
Dsˆ  = nT(yT - Ty ) + nR(yR – yM) > 0 
 Hence the claim.   
 
Intra-country income disparity means different marginal willingness-to-pay within a country for the 
innovated drug. This creates scope for price discrimination among the buyers in each country only 
if the MNC can segment the market by offering incentive-compatible different price-quality pairs 
to the different types of buyers. But with zero production cost and sunk R&D cost, such a 
separating menu (or price and quality discrimination) is not profitable for the MNC as 
demonstrated elsewhere [Acharyya (1998)]10. Thus, the monopolist offers the same innovated 
quality to all and, under the assumption of full market coverage, sets a low uniform price for that 
uniform quality. To compensate for the loss of profit due to the lower (uniform) price, the MNC 
thus lowers the level of innovation compared to that when all buyers have the same (higher) 
income. What follows immediately is that a transfer of income from the rich to the poor in each 
country that lowers intra-country income disparity will induce a higher level of innovation under 
















 > 0. But the changes in the intra-









, have no 




                                                  
10 Even though it may be difficult to conceive that a MNC will innovate an inferior quality drug, Szymanski and 
Valletti (2005) offer some explanations for such a possibility.  
11 As can be seen from the appendix, the innovation level varies among full market coverage and the three cases of 
partial market coverage. Thus, only if the population of Third world, say, is redistributed over the two income groups 
in such a way that inequality in (17a) is now reversed, the innovation level changes.  
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3.2  Parallel Imports, Innovation and Welfare 
Under parallel imports, given (17b) and for the relative size of the Third world large enough to 
induce the MNC to serve it, viz.,  
 











1                                                                                  (12a) 
the global uniform price Ty s is charged to all consumers everywhere (see appendix). Proceeding 
as before, the chosen level of health-care innovation equals, 
 
               ePIsˆ  = (nT + nR) Ty                                                                                            (19) 
 
which is smaller than the innovation level when there is no intra-country income disparity [see eq. 
(11b)]. Thus, once again under the set of assumptions made in (15) and (16), intra-country income 
disparity per se lowers the level of innovation when all buyers are served.  Moreover, from (18) 
and (19) it is apparent that the under-investment result holds once again: ePIsˆ  < 
e
Dsˆ .   
 
Comparing the equilibrium prices, on the other hand, we observe that for the low-income country 
the price under parallel trading is once again lower than the discriminatory price charged under 
MBD: 






PI ssyPP                                                                          (20) 
 
The reason is the same as before. Since under parallel imports a lower quality of the innovated drug 
is chosen, consumers in the poor country must be charged a lower price than under MBD. Note that 
this result holds even when, first, the countries have the same lowest marginal willingness-to-pay, 
Ty , and second, consumers are continuously distributed over an income range [ jyy, ]. This is 
because, as we have explained earlier, the result depends more on the extent of market coverage 
and the innovation level than on anything else. When the poorest of the buyers in the Third World 
are served under both MBD and PI, as the MNC innovates a lower quality drug it must charge a 
lower price as well to induce them to buy the innovated drug. This possibility was overlooked in 
Valletti (2006) where consumers in each country are continuously and uniformly distributed over 
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different income ranges, because the partial market coverage was implicitly assumed. But as 
Wauthy (1996) and Acharyya (1998) have demonstrated, the extent of market coverage should be 
an outcome of profit-maximizing behaviour of the firm(s) rather than an ex ante restriction. It can 
be easily checked in the simplified framework of Valletti (2006) that the parametric configurations 
for which the poorest country-market is always fully covered, (all) buyers there pay a lower 
uniform price of the innovated drug under PI than the lowest discriminatory price that they pay in 
absence of such parallel trading.  
 
Regarding the consumer surplus and welfare, note that the poorest income group in the Third world 
has the same net surplus of zero under both the regimes, whereas the poorest income group in the 
rich world (those having yM level of income) gains from parallel imports as they now derive strictly 
positive net surplus. The richer income group in the Third world (those having yM level of income), 
however, unambiguously loses: 
 
                  eDePITMeDTeDMePIePIM ssyyPsyPsy ˆˆˆˆˆˆ    < 0 
 
This is because the under-investment hurts them more than the price decline makes them better off 
as they value the quality of health-care highly. For the richest in the rich world, on the other hand, 
the net gain per capita from PI equals: 
 
                RRMRTRTeDReDRePIePIR ynynynnPsyPsy  )(ˆˆˆˆ   < 0 
 
Thus, they gain from parallel trading only when their (per capita) income is smaller in the 
following sense: 
 







                                                                                    (21) 
 
The intuition is simple. Under PI, the buyers gain from the lower price of the drug, but lose from a 
smaller innovation. Under the full market coverage, the price decline does not depend on the 
income (or marginal valuation) of the richest of buyers as evident from (18) – (20). But, the utility 
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loss from a smaller innovation under PI,  eDePIR ssy ˆˆ  , increases proportionately with the income 
level.  Hence, the gain in the price overcompensates the loss from lower health-care innovation for 
them only if their income and marginal valuation for higher innovation is not large in the sense 
defined in (21).  
 
These effects are summarized in the following Lemma: 
 
Lemma 5:  With intra as well as inter country income differences, if it is profitable for  
the MNC to serve all markets and all consumers, parallel imports makes the 
poorer buyers in the Third world as well off as under MBD, the richer buyers 
there strictly worse off and the poorer buyers in the rich world strictly better 
off. The richest buyers are better off only for relatively low income or 
valuation as defined in (21). 
                 Proof: Follows from the above discussion.   
 
Since the social welfare in the Third World equals only the sum of consumer surpluses, the above 
result in Lemma 5 implies that parallel trading lowers the Third World welfare unambiguously. 
Note that the parallel exporters there earn zero profit. On the other hand, as shown in the appendix, 
despite gains for the buyers in the rich world, the loss of MNC-profit is so large as to lower the 
welfare of the rich world as well. Thus, 
 
Proposition 2: When all countries are served for the relative country size defined in (12a), 
parallel import of the innovated drug from the Third to the rich world 
lowers the welfare of both the trading nations. 
 
Proof:  For the Third world, the adverse welfare effect follows from Lemma 5. The decline 
in welfare of the rich world is shown in the appendix.   
 
This result has some far reaching implications. If the national governments put equal weights on 
consumer surplus and producer’s profit (wherever applicable) in calculating the national welfare, 
and choose trade regimes for the patented drugs on that basis, neither the Third world government 
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nor the rich world government will prefer parallel trading over MBD by the patent-holder MNC. 
This is in contrary to Richardson (2002) who demonstrated that if countries (simultaneously) 
choose parallel imports, global uniform pricing would be the Nash equilibrium outcome. The 
reason for such a Nash equilibrium obtained by Richardson is that the high-price countries that 
experience welfare gains from a lower (global uniform) price under parallel importing can undo 
price discrimination.  But our Proposition 2 shows that when the adverse dynamic R&D effect of 
parallel import allowed by the high-price rich world is taken into account, there is no reason for the 
rich world to undo price discrimination. Thus, Richardson’s result does not extend to R&D 
investment. At the same time, Proposition 2 shows that his second result regarding price 
discrimination as (Nash) equilibrium need not depend upon the ability of low-price countries to 
restrict parallel exports of the patented drug and hence to undo uniform pricing in this R&D case. 
Indeed, even if the MNC’s profits are not included in the calculation of the rich country’s welfare, 
there may be income distribution patterns in the rich country such that they still prefer price 
discrimination and this is of course in contrast with the no intra-inequality case we saw in the 
previous section. 
 
3.3 Partial Market Coverage and Consumer Surplus 
So far we have assumed total marked coverage both with and without MBD. Tables 1 to 4 describe 
the impact of parallel imports on consumer surplus of each income group under all possible partial 
coverage combinations. To distinguish between income earners yM in the Third and the rich world, 
we re-label their incomes as yTM and yRM respectively. 
 
Table 1 illustrates the case when the poorest buyers in the Third world are excluded by the MNC 
under parallel trading. Appendix IV shows the income distribution patterns in the two countries for 
which such partial coverage of the Third world under parallel trading but full coverage of all 
markets under MBD are the equilibrium outcomes. Thus now under PI, the MNC charges the 
globally uniform price yMs. Note that, in this case, the Proposition 2 holds even more strongly 
because the richest of the buyers in the rich world lose unambiguously from parallel imports and so 
do the richest in the poor country, whilst the less rich in each country are just indifferent. The 
intuition behind this effect is clear. As the poorest group is not served under parallel imports, the 
richer of the third world country lose because now all their surplus is being extracted by the MNC 
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through the price syTM. The poorer group in the richer country already had their entire consumer 
surplus extracted even with MBD, just as with parallel imports now. Finally, the richest group gets 
a lower quality under parallel imports, not compensated by the reduced price. Thus, even without 
consideration for MNC location, if countries (simultaneously) choose parallel imports, MBD could 
arise as the Nash Equilibrium since the rich country will have no incentive to undo price 
discrimination. That is, in this particular case of partial coverage of the Third world under parallel 
trading, the Richardson’s (2002) result is invalidated even when we consider only the sum of 
consumers’ surpluses as the rich country’s welfare. 
 
Another interesting case is that described in Table 3, where MBD actually reduces the extent of 
market coverage (see appendix). The intuition there is that relative to the richer income group 
within the rich country, the yRM income group might be small and therefore, not covered under 
MBD. However, under PI, this group might be made sufficiently significant to be served by it 
being pulled with the yTM group in the poor country. This case is interesting because it is usually 
thought that MBD is a device to increase market coverage, but this would provide a counter-
example for that. This is relevant from a policy point of view even if the whole country’s welfare is 
still taken into account, as it is often the case that consumption of health is associated to positive 
externalities. 
 
For completeness, Tables 2 and 4 present the other possible cases of partial coverage. However, in 
those cases consumer surplus with and without PI remains unchanged. Indeed, in the case presented 
in Table 2 not even the MNC’s profit changes.  
 
Table 1: Partial coverage and Richardson (2002) Result 
 MBD PI CSPI  - CSD 
Ry  
Covered Covered negative 
RMy    Covered Covered 0 
TMy  Covered Covered negative 
Ty    
Covered NOT Covered 0 
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Table 2: The poorest buyers are not covered in either cases 
 MBD PI CSPI  - CSD 
Ry   
Covered Covered 0 
RMy    Covered Covered 0 
TMy  Covered Covered 0 
Ty    
NOT covered NOT covered 0 
 
Table 3: MBD reduces market coverage 
 MBD PI CSPI  - CSD 
Ry  
Covered Covered Positive 
RMy    NOT covered Covered 0 
TMy  Covered Covered 0 
Ty    
NOT covered NOT covered 0 
 
Table 4: Only the richest buyers are served under PI 
 MBD PI CSPI  - CSD 
Ry   
Covered Covered 0 
RMy    NOT covered NOT covered 0 
TMy  Covered NOT covered 0 
Ty    




4. Partial Arbitrage: National, Regional and International Exhaustion of Property Rights 
As already discussed, the current debate on market access to new patented drugs highlights the 
importance of only allowing for national exhaustion of property rights so as to maximize the 
incentives for R&D investment. However, although the TRIPs Agreement advocates national 
exhaustion (and therefore argues against parallel imports), there is an explicit reference in the 
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agreement to the fact that the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding procedures cannot be used 
to implement such recommendation. Moreover, under the Doha declaration on TRIPs and public 
health, all WTO members are explicitly allowed to use international exhaustion, and therefore, 
import cheaper medicines from other countries, if they do not have own production facilities and 
there is an issue of public health on the line. Still, a considerable number of developed countries, 
including the EU members, and even, more recently, the high income developing countries (Hong 
Kong China, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Macao China, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates) have agreed to only use such system in case of national 
emergencies or other circumstances of extreme urgency12. At the same time, groups of developed 
countries such as EU members apply a rule of regional exhaustion at the EU level (whereby 
parallel imports cannot be prevented within the EU) and the US is considering parallel trade from 
other developed countries such as Canada and the EU. 
 
In this section, we investigate price discrimination between blocks of countries in a way that would 
reflect the above debate. A fairly straightforward way of presenting this in the context of the 
current model would be to reinterpret our two country setting with within country income 
disparities as a two two-country block model, a first block with a richer and a middle income 
country ( Ry  and My  respectively) and a second block with a middle and a lower income country 
( My  and Ty  respectively).  Now, our benchmark would be the case with the international 
exhaustion of property rights, in this case, parallel imports are allowed across all countries and 
there is a unique world price. This case corresponds to the analysis in section 3.2. A second 
possibility would be for the world to be divided in these two blocks of countries where only 
regional exhaustion applies, that is, parallel imports are allowed within but not between blocks and 
therefore there is scope for price discrimination between blocks. This case corresponds to the case 
analyzed in section 3.1. Finally, and possibly the closest case to reality would be to consider the 
regional exhaustion being implemented in the wealthier block (we could think of it as the EU), 
whereas only national exhaustion applies everywhere else. That is, the pharmaceutical MNC cannot 
price discriminate across the developed countries (it must set a single EU price) but, it can price 
discriminate between the out of the EU developing countries. This case would match our previous 
                                                  
12 See www.wto.org for a detailed description of this provision. 
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discussion. This possibility is half way between the two other cases already analyzed. In this case, 
the MNC will charge price syT  in the poorest country and price syM  everywhere else. Of course, 
the underlying assumption is that the poorest country in the EU-bloc (the country with per capita 
income level yM) is large enough in size relative to the richest country in the bloc in the sense 
defined in (17b) that makes it profitable for the MNC to serve both these EU countries (which we 
may call full EU coverage)13. Note that the difference with the discrimination between blocks 
(second case above) is that now the richer country outside the EU also faces price syM  and that the 
optimal quality will be higher since the higher marginal wiliness to pay for quality of this country 
is now being captured by the multinational. 
 
We can, therefore, ask ourselves, initially taking one world price as the benchmark, would 
countries prefer to move on to a system of regional exhaustion blocks (section 3.1) or a system 
where regional exhaustion applies only to the developed countries (EU) block? The answer will be 
different for every country type. Starting with the poorest country type Ty  (assuming coverage of 
all the markets in all the cases), this country will actually be indifferent between going from one 
world price to any of the other two systems as in every case their full consumer surplus is 
extracted. Regarding the poorer country in the EU block, they are just as unhappy about moving 
away from one world price to any of the other two systems as in both cases their full consumer 
surplus will now be extracted (when all the markets are served in all the cases).  
 
The difference now comes for the other two types of countries. The richer country outside of the 
EU will clearly prefer a system of regional blocks (developed and developing) as in that case it 
would pay a lower price (once again under the assumption that all markets are served) since the 
MNC would not be able to discriminate between it and the poorest country. Therefore, if richer 
countries out of the EU commit to not use parallel imports, they will eventually give up all their 
consumer surplus as a result and, unlike in the case of two regional blocks, they would actually 
prefer a one world price (worldwide parallel imports) to this situation as in this case the quality 
increase does not compensate for the price increase. 
                                                  
13 Otherwise, there would be the prices Tys and Msy   for the two countries outside the EU and s Ry  for the EU bloc 
(which denies market access for the poorest EU country under this particular TRIPS arrangement). 
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 Finally, we have the richest country in the EU who will indeed be happier about keeping regional 
exhaustion in the EU and out of the EU countries to commit to not allow parallel imports. The 
reason is that it still benefits from lower prices brought by an internal price arbitrage but now, as 
the MNC extracts more consumer surplus from out of the EU middle-income countries, the 
equilibrium quality will be higher.  
 
We can then conclude that only the richest countries strictly benefit from the latest commitment of 
out of the EU middle-income countries not to allow parallel imports, with the lower income 
countries within the EU and the poorest world country being indifferent albeit enjoying a higher 
quality.  It is worth reminding though that the highest incentives to innovate would be achieved 
when the MNC can fully price discriminate across all countries. 
 
Of course, a similar conclusion can be deduced if we allow for income disparity in each of these 
countries as long as the ranking of the equilibrium prices under these alternative regional and 
national exhaustion regimes remains the same.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have shown in terms of a very simple analytical framework that regardless of any intra country 
income differences, parallel imports result in a lower level of health-care innovation but, contrary 
to popular as well as conventional theoretical wisdom, a lower price in the third world compared to 
market-based discrimination. Despite such a lower price, however, parallel imports unambiguously 
make all buyers in the Third world worse off when intra-country income disparity exists. The only 
gainers from parallel imports appear to be the buyers in the rich world. But with the MNC-profit 
declining the rich world unambiguously loses. This leaves open the question why do countries 
often allow parallel trading, and points to the observations by Maskus (2005) and others that there 
may be considerations other than welfare. 
 
Malueg and Schwartz (1994) present a variation of their model structure in which demand types are 
placed into groups and price arbitrage is only possible across groups. They state that if demand 
dispersion is low enough to ensure that all demand types would always be served at some prices, 
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the uniform pricing would result in the same welfare as price discrimination across these groups. 
The reinterpretation of our model structure in section 4 above is motivated along the same line. 
But, contrary to Malueg and Schwartz (1994), we find that with endogenous quality, price 
discrimination is actually superior to uniform pricing and indeed we can also say that no group 







I. Proof of Lemma 3:  
Let D, ,
~~,~ DD  and Dˆ denote profits of the MNC when all buyers in all markets are served (i.e., 
full coverage of all markets), only rich buyers in the Third world and all buyers in the rich world 
are served, all buyers in the Third world but only rich buyers in the rich world are served, and only 
the rich buyers in each country are served respectively.  Proceeding as in the text, the following 
values of these profits can be easily checked: 
 
              D  = [nT Ty + nRyM]
2/2                                                                                (A.1) 
              D
~  = [(nTM  + nR)yM)]
2/2                                                                            (A.2) 
              D
~~  = [nT Ty + nR2 Ry ]
2/2                                                                          (A.3)  
               Dˆ =  [nTM yM + nR2 Ry ]
2/2                                                                      (A.4) 
 
Thus, given the full market coverage in the rich world, all buyers in the Third world are served if D  
> D










1 . On the other hand, given full market coverage in the Third world, the 
MNC will prefer to cater all buyers in rich country if D  > D












. In other words, under these income distribution patterns, the MNC 
would prefer to cater “all” buyers to “some” buyers in one country and all buyers in the other.  
 
Finally, note that since the richest buyers in the Third world and the poorest buyers in the rich 
world have the same income level yM, so the same condition (17b) ensures that D
~~  > Dˆ . 
Therefore, if the income distribution patterns in the two countries satisfy these two conditions, then 
               D > D
~   
              D > D
~~  > Dˆ  
That is, the MNC serves all buyers everywhere under MBD. 
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Since profit in each of these cases is equal to half the squared value of the innovated quality level, 
so the innovation by the MNC under MBD varies with the income distribution pattern. Under 
conditions (17a) and (17b), the innovation level is the highest.  
 
II.  Formal derivation of condition (12.a) 
There are three pricing and market coverage options for the MNC under Parallel Imports (PI): 
 
Possibility 1 realizing a profit of 1: serve all markets and all buyers by charging the price Ty s 
 
Possibility 2 realizing a profit of 2: serve all markets and all buyers except the poorest one in the 
Third world by charging the price syM 
 
Possibility 3 realizing a profit of 3: serve only the richest in the rich world by charging the price 
Ry s 
 
We call possibility 1 as the full (global) market coverage. 
 












. Condition (17b) for 











 ensures this.  
 
So given (17b), for full (global) market coverage (that is possibility 1) under PI all we need to 
check is whether 1 > 2. And the following condition ensures 
this: 
 











1     
 
 
III. Welfare of the Rich World under full market covergae 
Let RiW denote the welfare of the rich world under regime i = D, PI, which is the sum of consumers 
surplus, RiS , and the MNC profit. Hence, 
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This after simplification boils down to, 
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IV. Partial Market Coverage: 
From Appendices I and II above, we can identify parametric configurations that determine the 










 denote the (relative) 
income disparity in the Third world and in the rich world respectively. The following figures then 
illustrate different possibilities. 
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                   Figure 1: Third World Market Coverage given full coverage of Rich World                                                                           
                    









                                                               
                                                           
                                    
             Partial coverage of the rich-                 Full coverage of rich-world                                            
                             world market under MBD                    market under MBD   
                                                               
           
                                    TMRR nn 2                                                   
                O                                                                                                                              nRM 
                                                                           2RRn                      
 
                                2 < 3                                 2 > 3 
                       Partial coverage                
                       under PI                           Full Coverage under PI 
                          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
                                
                                  Figure 2: The Extent of the Rich World Market Coverage   
 
Now, suppose  
             nT1    TRTMTTMT nnn  ,                                                             (A.5) 
and       nRM > 2RRn                                                                                         (A.6) 
 
The latter is in fact the condition (17b) in the text.  
 
Then, the Third-world market is partially served whereas the rich-world market is fully served 
under PI because 1 < 2 and 2 > 3 in such a case (see appendix II above). However, all buyers 
everywhere is served under MBD even with such a size of the poorest buyers in the Third-world 
since (17a) still holds.  The welfare property of this case is discussed in Table 1 in the text. 
 
The case in which MBD reduces market coverage, as discussed in Table 3 in the text, on the other 
hand, arises under the following parametric configuration: 
  
              nT1 <  TMT n                                                                                        (A.7) 
              nRM     22 , RRTMRR nnn                                                               (A.8) 
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Once again, the Third-world market is partially served whereas the rich-world market is fully 
served under PI because 1 < 2 and 2 > 3 for these parametric configurations. Under MBD, on 
the other hand, since both the conditions (17a) and (17b) are violated, only the richer buyers in 
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